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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAII

GOLD OIL LAUD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation,

)
)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,)

vs.
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KR·ISTI
Alm DAVIS, his wife, WADE R.
DAVIS and MRS. WADE DAVIS,
his wife, and LEO M.
BERTAG!lOLE, a single man,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 16461

Defendants and Appellant.)
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STEVEN C. DAVIS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 1977, Steven C. Davis became associated with
Gold Oil Land Development Corporation, plaintiff-respondent
herein (hereinafter referred to as "Gold"), a business enterprise concerned with the promotion and development of real
property located in Utah County.
Defendant-Appellant Davis' involvement with Gold was
precipitated by his acquaintance with Verdi R. White, Sr.,
chairman of the board of Gold.
During the period of his involvement with Gold,
including the period encompassed by this cause of action,
defendant-appellant Davis' activities were directed toward
the prevention and resolution of disagreements with Gold
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and purchasers of the property in Utah County in which Gold
had acquired an option interest and securing other purchasers
for the remaining acreage in this 142-acre tract.
The issue presented to the trial court was the validity
of certain conveyances of acreage in the aforementioned tract
of real estate.

The· first conveyance in question is a quit·

claim deed dated March 17, 1977, and recorded in the office
of the Utah County Recorder on May 3, 1977, as Entry Number
13261 (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1), wherein Gold conveyed
approximately 12-1/2 acres to Leo H. Bertagnole.

The second

conveyance in question was evidenced by a quit-claim deed
dated Hay 3, 1977, and recorded in the office of the Utah
County Recorder as Entry Number 13263 on May 3, 1977 (Defendants' Exhibit Number 3), wherein Leo M. Bertagnole conveyed approximately 10 acres to Steven C. Davis and his wife,
Kristi Davis.
The final judgment of the trial court determined also
the effect of a subsequent conveyance by Steven Davis and
Kristi

Davis of approximately 10 acres.

This transaction

appears in the record as a warranty deed executed May 2,
1978, and recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder,
Entry Number 23471, on June 15, 1978.
Number 2).

(Defendants' Exhibit

The court also determined the effect of the

quit-claim deed acknowledged April 4, 1977, and recorded
May 3, 1977, in the office of the Utah County Recorder

.2.
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where approximately 12-1/2 acres were conveyed by Steven c.
Davis and Kristi Davis to Leo M. Bertagnole.
Preliminary inquiry into the background of this lawsuit is essential.

Hard feelings which culminated in this

action arose between Verdi R. White, Sr., and Steven C.
Davis in Harch, 1977, after Mr. White's return from a vacation.

These hostilities were resultant from the senior

Mr. White's categorization of Mr. Davis' activities during
Mr. White's absence from the state.

For reasons and by means

irrelevant to this instant action, Hr. Davis had recorded
a warranty deed from Gold to Steven C. Davis and Kristi
Davis of approximately 142 acres in Utah County.
Exhibit Humber 12).

(Plaintiff's

Previously, in December, 1976, Gold had

obtained from Mack Jacobsen and E. D. Jacobsen an option
agreement for the purchase of approximately 142 acres in Utah
County, the subject property of the aforementioned deed.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 4).
Upon learning of the above-described conveyance to Steven
Davis and Kristi Davis, Mr. White, on behalf of Gold, is
depicted as attempting to recover the property conveyed in
the aforesaid warranty deed and to end the association with
Mr. Davis.
On March 16, 1977, defendant-appellant Davis and Verdi

R. White, Sr., met in the offices of James B. Medlin, an
attorney, in an attempt to reconcile their differences .
. 3.
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Resultant from this meeting was an agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 4) wherein Steven C. Davis was given until
5:00 p.m., March 18, 1977, to consurmnate the negotiations
currently in progress with Leo 11. Bertagnole for the purchase of approximately 12-1/2 acres in Utah County.

Further-

more, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations with
Mr. Bertagnole, Steven Davis and Kristi Davis were to
reconvey to Gold the entire Salem Hills acreage which Gold
had acquired from Mack and E. D. Jacobsen.
The Salem Hills property was duly reconveyed to Gold
and was not a matter in controversy at trial.
However, the negotiations between Steven C. Davis and
Verdi R. White, Sr., Verdi R. White II, Fred Mowrey, James
Medlin, and Leo U. Bertagnole on March 17 and March 18, 1977,
were the subject of the instant trial.

Defendant-appellant Davis and defendant Leo M. Bertagnole
maintained that all concerned parties had agreed on March 18,
1977, that Leo M. Bertagnole would purchase the acreage in
question for $10,000.

The defendants further contended that

the documentary proof of this consummated transaction is
evidenced by an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5), a check for the consideration
price stated in the earnest money receipt and offer to purchase (Defendants' Exhibit Number 6), and a warranty deed
from Gold to Leo M. Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit Number
1).

.4.
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The plaintiff asserted at trial that, in accordance
with the agreement prepared by Mr. Medlin (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 4) and a letter from Verdi R. White, Sr.,
to Leo M. Bertagnole dated March 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Humber 10), the negotiations for the purchase of the
12-1/2 acres in Salem Hills was never consummated.

The

plaintiff further contended that the four deeds described
earlier evidencing various interests in this parcel of land
were invalid and defective.
The trial court found that there may have been a conditional delivery of the deed from Gold to Leo Bertagnole
but that the stated conditions were not met and thus the
deeds in question were void of any legal force and effect.
Defendant-appellant Davis believes that the trial court
erroneously decided that the deed from Gold to Leo Bertagnole
was conditionally delivered, that the conditions were never
fully complied with, and that the deeds from Leo Bertagnole
to Steven Davis and Kristi Davis and from Steven Davis,
Kristi Davis, and Wade Davis and the deed from Steven C.
Davis and Kristi Davis to Leo Bertagnole were null and void.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT
Trial in this matter was held on April 2, 1979, in the
District Court of Salt Lake County.
On April 12, 1979, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock,
judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of

. 5.
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Utah, found that the delivery of a quit-claim deed to
defendant Leo M. Bertagnole was conditional.
Furthermore, Judge Bullock found that the conditions
necessary to effectuate a valid absolute delivery to defendant Leo 11. Bertagnole had never been performed.
Lastly, the trial judge voided all subsequent conveyances of the subject property by defendant Leo Bertagnole
and his grantees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defer.dant-appellant Steven C. Davis seeks to have the
lower court's decision reversed as a matter of law; in the
alternative, the defendant-appellant seeks to have this
court remand the matter to the lower court for a factual
hearing on the merits of this case.
FIRST ARGUMENT
DID THE PLAINTIFF SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF AT TRIAL?
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT ANS'\-illRS "YES."
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ANSWERS "NO."
Parenthetical references found in the body of this brief
are abbreviated so that "T" refers to testimony recorded in
the trial transcript at the pages designated.
Defendant-appellant's initial argument, that the plaintiff did not sustain its burden of proof at the trial, is
delineated into the following three distinct points:
. 6.
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1.

That the findings of the lower court are not

supported by competent evidence.
2.

That much of the testimony and evidence pre-

sented at trial had no probative value in determining
a central issue in dispute, as it dealt with matters
remote in time; and
3.

That the evidence clearly preponderates

against the findings made by the trial court.
Each of these points are addressed below in the order rostered above.
The trial court concluded that "at best, there was a
conditional delivery" and that the recorded deeds had no
legal force and effect as the conditions precedent to a
valid delivery thereof were never satisfied.

(Tl66, Tl67).

Determination of whether there was an absolute delivery
or conditional delivery of the quit-claim deed from the
plaintiff-respondent to Leo M. Bertagnole (Defendants'
Exhibit Number 1) was premised upon testimony of Verdi R.
vfuite, Sr. (Tl6, Tl7, Tl8, T25, T26), Fred Mowrey (T44),
Steven Davis (T80, T81, T83), and Leo M. Bertagnole (Tl06)
and a carbon copy of a letter purporting to state specified
conditions precedent to the consummation of the conveyance
of real estate to Leo U. Bertagnole.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

Number 10).
. 7.
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Verdi R. White, Sr., testified at trial (T26) that the
letter containing escrow instructions (Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number 10) was dictated by him to Steve Davis.

However,

Mr. White could not recall affixing his signature to this
document (T26).

The original letter was not produced at

trial, and Mr. White's signature on this letter (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 10) cannot be proven or disproven.

There-

fore, the assumption of the trial court that Mr. White did
commit himself, by the physical act of signing his name, to
the stated principles and intentions is logically faulty and
subject to great non-persuasion and disbelief.

There was

no testimony from any other witness that would categorically
affix Mr. White's signature to this document (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 10) and which would support the findings of
the trial court.
Absent competent testimony that Mr. White did sign the
document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), a reasonable belief
that Mr. White did not intend to impose the conditions expressed within the document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nu.mber 10)
upon the negotiations for the sale of the 12-1/2 acres to
Mr. Bertagnole should be sustained.

Mr. White, Sr. , dictated

the document's contents and was present when the document
was drafted.

Logic mandates that Mr. White, Sr. , would

have immediately signed this letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number 10) if he were indeed attempting to impose the conditions therein on these negotiations.

Furthermore, it

. 8.
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is only logical that Hr. White, Sr. , would be able to recall
signing this document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10).
At trial, however, it was never demonstrated that
Mr. White, Sr., signed the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Humber
10) or even that he recalled doing so.

It is defendant-

appellant Davis' contention that there is no competent
testimony or evidence indicating that the letter was signed
by Verdi R. Uhite, Sr.

Certainly, if the person authorized

to make business transactions and negotiations conditional
fails to do so, it is neither within the prerogative or the
ability of the trial judge to manufacture the existence of
the conditions precedent.

To blithely leap the parameters

of logic and .reasonableness alters the complexion of the
litigation before the court and manifestly prejudices the
party against whom the assumed conditions are imposed.
Substantiation that the .letter drafted March 17, 1977
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), and the aforedescribed
testimony relating to the contents therein are not competent
evidence is found in 31 Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence,
Section 2, at page 816:
By "competent" evidence is meant that
which the very nature of the thing to be
proved requires as the fit and appropriate
proof in the particular case. "Competent
evidence" means evidence which tends to
establish the fact in issue and does not
rest on mere surmise or guess ...
. 9.
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Precendential case law from.this state's highest
court also demands the introduction and consideration of
competent evidence.
An offer of proof must be certain,
sufficient, and intelligible and must
definitely state the facts sought to be
proved. It must show the materiality,
competency, and relevancy of the evidence
offered. Dansak v. Deluke, 12 Utah 2d
302, 366 P.2d 67, 70 (1961).
Conjecture of the purest form and testimonial extrapolation premised upon surmise and guess were proferred to
prove that Verdi R. White, Sr., did affix his name to the
letter drafted March 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number
10), and that the negotiations for the sale of the Salem
Hills property was structured by conditions precedent.

Such

evidentiary offerings are clearly beyond the realm of competent evidence and must be found inadmissible.

Dansak,

supra.
Clearly, the assumption by the trial judge that the
sale of the parcel of property in Salem Hills to Leo
Bertagnole was conditional merely because several parties
to the transaction were involved in the drafting of a letter
detailing a future desire to impose conditions upon the
transaction is erroneous and constitutes patently harmful
error to the defendant-appellant Davis.
The above-complained of asslll!lption by the trial judge
manifestly falls within the test utilized by the Supreme
.10.
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court of Utah in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 236, 495
P.2d 811 (1972), to determine if reversible error was committed.

The court stated at page 814:
To be considered along with the foregoing is this further proposition relative
to errors which are assigned in attempting
to reverse a judgment: the inquiry is not
merely whether some error may have been committed. It. is whether there was any error
of a sufficient nature that it is reasonable to believe that it adversely affected
the appellant or deprived him of a fair
trial in such a way that in the absence of
such error there is a reasonable likelihood
that the outcome would have been different.

Certainly, the erroneous categorization of the delivery
of the quit-claim deed to Leo Bertagnole (Defendants'
Exhibit Number 1) as being conditional rather than absolute
altered the probable outcome of this litigation.

Furthermore,

the erroneous characterization which was formulated upon a
faulty assumption premised upon non-persuasive testimony
is so egregious to defendant-appellant Davis that reversal
of the lower court's findings is the only mandated course
of action.
In conjunction with the testimony of Verdi R. White,
Sr. (Tl6, Tl 7, TlS, T25, T26), Fred Mowrey (T44, TSO, T81),
Steven Davis (TSO, T83), and Leo Bertagnole (Tl06) regarding
the contents of the letter of Har ch 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 10), the court utilized the document
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) to substantiate its findings
.11.
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that the delivery of the quit-claim deed to Leo Bertagnole
was conditional.
The document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) is not
competent, admissible evidence and should not have been given
significant credibility by the trial court.

Counsel for

the defendant-appellant Steven Davis objected at trial (Tl7)
that the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) was violative
of the original document or "best evidence" rule.
McCormick, in his book, The Handbook Law of Evidence,
1954, at page 409, defines this rule in the following manner:
The specific tenor of this requirement
needs to be definitely stated and its limits
clearly understood. The rule is this: in
providing the terms of a writing, where such
terms are material, the original writing must
be produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious
fault of the proponent.
Among the policy reasons given for this rule, Professor
McCormick, supra, cites a rationale that is explicitly
appropriate to this cause of action:
The policy justification for the rule
preferring the original writing lies in the
fact (a) that precision in presenting to
the court the exact words of the writing is
of more than average importance, particularly
as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills, and contracts,
since a slight variation in words may mean
a great difference in rights . . . .
McCormick, supra, at page 410.
At trial conclusive substantiation that the negotiations with defendant Bertagnole were conditional were
.12.
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almost exclusively dependent upon a carbon copy of the letter
drafted March 17, 1977.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10).

No viable explanation was proferred at trial which accounted
for the absence of the original letter.
It is not the author's intent to suggest that there
were any alterations made.

In large part, the "best evi-

dence" rule was promulgated to prevent the introduction and
utilization of untrustworthy evidence at trial.

However,

the point cannot too strongly be made that the original
letter was not produced at trial nor was there any accounting
made for the non-availability of the original.

Essentially

no precautions were taken to assure that altered evidence
was not before the court for consideration.
Furthermore, the carbon copy of the letter (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 10) was improperly admitted into evidence.
Assuming that this document (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10)
is secondary evidence, the uncontroverted reality is that
the exhibit was accepted in evidence in total absence of
a foundation for its admissibility being laid.
Juris Secundum, Evidence, Section 882, page 163.

32 Corpus
Stevens

v. Gray, 259 P.2d 889 (1953).
This piece of evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10)
is violative of the "best evidence" rule.

Furthermore,

justification for the submission of a copy was never tendered, nor was there any attempt made to lay a foundation
.13.
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evide~ce.

for its acceptance as secondary

~ata!ly

defec-

tive for so cany reasons, it (Plaintiff's :C:x'.-.i"::iit ::c.::-.)e::10) should never have been a

detercinati~e

factor in the

resolution of this action.
Equally significant and deserving of careful attention is the intended utilization of
(Plaintiff's Exhibit

~~u;::ber

10).

t~is

carbon copy.

A.-iy credence .;iven to t::e

contents of the letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit ::u=':Jer 2.0)
significantly changes the legal r::eaning of not or:ly the
quit-claic deed fron plaintiff-respondent to defendant
Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit :iu=ber 1) but also all st:"::sequent conveyances such as that fro:::i de£er:cant Berta.g:-.o:'..e
to defendant-appellant Davis.

(Plaintiff's Exhi':Ji t :·:c.:."":"::er

3).

This legal ceta::;:orphosis ;.;as acco:::plis'.led in

di~-ect

contravention of the ancient sagagious r;::andate that a deec
must be construed as any other docu:::ent, that is "::iy fi:-st
refering to the four corners of the instru:::ent itself.
The conveyance fro;:; pla.intiff-responcient to defenda:-:t
Leo Bertagnole

~as

effectuated by a quit-claic deed that

is absolute on its face.
Like~ise,

there are no

(Defendar..ts' Ex'.-libit ::ur:ber 10).
expressed conditions ap?earing on

the conveyance free defendant Bertagnole to defendantappellant Davis.

(Plaintiff's [Xi'tibit ::u=ber 3).

It is incu=:bent that the granter clearl:.: evidences
his intent whenever appropriate.
.14.

\'erdi :K.

~-:1iite,
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Sr.,

~ac

a=ple O?portunity to ensure that language making the

conveyance to Leo Bertagnole (Defendant

Exhibit Humber

1) conditional appear on the face of this instruwent.

(Jefe:-icants' Ex'.-.ibit lill!2ber 1).
\·;':-iether this ele2entary precaution was intentionally or
:.:nir-,tentior-.ally neglected is of no legal consectuence.

The

::::::-.\·eyance =ro::: plaintiff-respondent to defendant Bertagnole
a:-.ci all subsec:uent transfers involving the Salerri Hills property and the parties to this action nust be proclaimed valid.
~~;:-.e:-e

construction of a deed is necessary to deten:i.ine an

incivid~al's

interest in real property, the deed is con-

s:rued in favor of the grantee and in favor of vesting
:itle.
Cinta~

4 Tiffany Real Propertv, Section 978.

aeagher v.

Gas Co., 225 P.2d 989 (Utah 1953).

Judicial adherence to the above-stated proposition by
:::-te Suprer::e Court of Utah is also found in Wood v. Ashby,

253 P.2d 351 (1953), at page 353:
It is generally concluded that a deed
is to be construed most strongly against
the gra:itor and r::ost fa\·orably to the grantee.
(Citations in text onitted.) It is also construed that in this state that a deed should
be construed so as to effectuate the intentions a:-ic desi:-es of the uarties, as canifested bv the language cade use of in the
deed.
(Citations in text oBitted; emphasis
added by author.)
!he language "hereby quit-claics" found in the deed
:re= the plaintiff-respondent to the defendant Leo Bertagnole
.15.
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(Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) indicates a contemporaneous
desire to effectuate the conveyances to defendant Bertagnole.
Adherence to the language of present intent utilized by the
plaintiff-respondent and the axiomatic proposition construing a deed in favor of the grantee is resultant in a
valid conveyance from plaintiff-respondent to defendant
Bertagnole.
In a decision that was grieviously erroneous and singularly prone to disdain the "best evidence" rule and case
law precedent from this jurisdiction, the trial court
declared invalid the interests of defendant Bertagnole and
defendant-appellant Davis to the property in Salem Hills
because certain conditions precedent were not met.

A

judicially proper deternination of defendant-appellant
Davis' interest in the ten acre parcel of land in Salem
Hills is possible only by a reversal of the lower court's
decision.
The action initiated by the plaintiff-respondent
focused upon the rightful ownership of approximately 12-1/2
acres of real property in the Salem Hills area of Utah
County.
As evidenced by the matters specifically rostered in
its complaint, the plaintiff-respondent petitioned the court
to consider and arbitrate only those transactions involving
the parties named in this action and the conveyance of
this acreage in Salem Hills .

. 16.
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Indeed, the issue presented to the court was not
overly complex in substance or chronological occurrences.
However

simple the issue central to this action,

presentation of the plaintiff-respondent's prima facie case
was notable for the inordinate amount of time devoted to
the presentation of testimony and evidence utterly lacking
in probative value essential to deciding it.
Nearly all of this cumbersome testimony and evidence
dealt with events preceding the negotiations between the
parties to this suit for the divesture of the 12-1/2 acres
from plaintiff-respondent.
Every witness who testified at trial was requested
or allowed to explain their particular knowledge of the
development of the

Sale~

Hills area in Utah County and the

business associations between the parties involved in this
action.

Verdi R. White, Sr. (T7, T8, T9, TlO, TU, T24,

T30, Tl28, Tl29); Fred Mowrey (T35, T36, T37, T38, T39,
T42, T46, T47, T48, T49); Steven C. Davis (T52, T53, T54,
T45, T57, T58, T59, T60, T61, T62, T63, T64, T65, T66,
T67, T69, T70, T71, T72, T73, T75, T76, T77, T92, Tl37,
'
Tl38, Tl44); Leo M. Bertagnole (TlOl,
Tl02, Tl03, Tl04,

TlOS, Tlll, Tll3, Tll4).
Inquiring into the above-described matters was not
conducive to a judicial pronouncement characterized by
its unwavering impartiality or intelligibleness.
Nearly every corrnnunication detailing the background
of this action was irrelevant and immaterial.

Dansak,
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supra.

Such digressions should have been quickly halted.

Each item of documentary evidence explaining historical
matters preceding this action, such as Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number 9, dealt with matters collatera.l to the primary
subject of this action and was totally void of any probative value.
Much of these incidental offerings of background data
were unsympathetic and prejudicial to defendant-appellant
Davis' posture before the court.

Note the judge's charac-

terization of the proceedings as "argumentative."

(T67).

Additionally, the effect of this cumulative, nonprobative testimony was to confuse the attorneys and the judge
Note the court's difficulty in relating the testimony being
given and the subject matter of this litigation.
do you get to the 12-1/2 acres?"
true, Hr. White.

(T62)

"How

"I think that is

I have difficulty in relating it to the

12-1/2 acres that I thought was the subject of this lawsuit."
(T68).
The defendant-appellant Steven Davis is mindful and
appreciative of the effort evidenced by the trial court to
comprehend the issues presented at trial and to relate the
testimony offered in court to the subject matter of the
lawsuit.

No fault may be found with the trial court's

attentiveness at trial.
The matter of particular concern to defendant-appellant
Davis is that numerous matters which were not germane to
.18.
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the central issue were allowed to obliterate the issue at
hand and possibly preclude a clear and fair consideration
of the merits of this litigation.

Thus, the defendant-

appellant petitions this court to reverse the decision of
the lower court or to remand the matter for retrial without
the taint of the aforedescribed irrelevant matters.
Testimony from several witnesses clearly indicated
that the plaintiff-respondent was amendable to the purchase
of the option for the 12-1/2 acres by Leo Bertagnole for
the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

Steven Davis

stated that Verdi R. ·white, Sr., and other associates of
the plaintiff-respondent were present in Leo Bertagnole's
office and uttered no objections when the purchase price
of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for the option on the
12-1/2 acres was agreed upon.
T90, T96, Tl35).

(T76, T77, T78, T79, T80,

Leo Bertagnole also testified that all

the parties involved were reconciled to the purchase price
of ten thousand dollars ($10, 000).
Tl20, Tl21).

(Tl05, Tl09. T118, T119,

Fred Mowrey testified that Verdi R. White was

present during the negotiations for the purchase price
but left before the earnest money agreement was drawn up.
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5).

(T49).

On Harch 13, 1977, subsequent to the agreement that
Leo Bertagnole was to purchase the option for the 12-1/2
acres for the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), an
.19.
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earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5-) was
drafted.

This earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit

Number 5) is signed by Leo Bertagnole and defendant-appellant
Davis.
The stated consideration of one hundred dollars ($100)
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 5) was paid to Jim Medlin, an
attorney who was acting as an agent for both Verdi R. '\Jhite,
Sr., the plaintiff-respondent's president, and Steven
Davis, the defendant-appellant.
6).

(Defendants' Exhibit Number

(Tl09, TllO).

Upon execution of the earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5), Leo Bertagnole was given a quitclaim deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1).

This quit-claim

deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was prepared in the
office of l1r. Bertagnole.
Jim Medlin was an attorney who was openly representing
Verdi R. White, Sr. , the president of plaintiff-respondent,
and defendant-appellant Steve Davis.

During the two-day

period that negotiations for a mutually agreeable purchase
price were being conducted, Mr. Medlin was vested with the
ostensible authority to bind the plaintiff-respondent.

To

argue that he could not bind the plaintiff-respondent is
a non-meritorious, untenable position.

Restatement of

Agency, 2d, Section 170.
Numerous decisions from the Supreme Court of this
state support the proposition that the principal will be
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bound by the acts of his agent.

B and R Supply Company v.

Q£inghurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Skerl v.
Uillow Creek Coal Company, 92 Utah 472, 69 P.2d 502 (1973);
Santi V. Denver and Rio Grand He stern Railroad Company, 21
Utah 2d 155, 442 P.2d 921 (1968).
However, we recognize that there may
be circumstances created by the principal,
or for which it is responsible, and upon
which a third party reasonably can and
does rely, and in which instance the
principal may be bound by the representation made. Santi, supra.
Clearly, Verdi R. White, Sr., was instrumental in
catalyzing the manner and method by which the negotiations
with the defendant Bertagnole were conducted.

Likewise,

the plaintiff-respondent is bound by the agent Medlin' s
acceptance of the ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as the
purchase price, the one hundred dollar ($100) consideration, and the executed earnest money agreement.
dants

I

(Defen-

Exhibit number 5).

Shortly thereafter, defendant-appellant Steve Davis
and Kristi Davis conveyed their interest in this property
to Kristi Davis and Wade Davis.
Number 2).

(Qefendants' Exhibit

This deed was also recorded.

The evidence presented at trial to document the purchase price that was acquiesced to by all the concerned
parties, the valid delivery and recordation of each conveyance undeniably preponderates and overwhelms any evidence attempting to pr.ave the antithesis of the above .
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There can be no defensible argument that the trial
court's decision is correct.

Significant evidence of

considerable quantity and quality substantiates a conclusion totally antithetical to that of the trial court.
In the time honored and universally
accepted rule that a finding or verdict
must be supported by sustantial evidence,
the modifying objective "substantial" has
been used advisedly to indicate a higher
degree of proof than just any evidence
of any kind. The requirement is that the
evidence must be sufficient in amount and
credibility that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would justify
some, but not necessarily all, reasonable
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it
to be truth. And conversely, if when
so considered, the court is convinced
that it is so inconsequential, or so
clearly lacking in credibility, that no
jury acting fairly and reasonably could
so believe, it cannot properly be regarded
as substantial evidence. Utah State Road
Commission v. Steele Ranch, 533 P. 2d 838
(1975) at page 890.
The testimony of the witnesses Mowrey, Bertagnole,
and Davis paralleled and corroborated that of one
another for the most part.

Even where there are dif-

ferent recollections of events or discrepancies, they are
minor.
Defendant Bertagnole's interest in the 12-1/2 acres
in Utah County was filed and recorded.

The quit-claim

deed which evidences his interest in the property (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) is not apparently conditional,
nor are the recorded conveyances to defendant-appellants
Steven Davis, Kristi Ann Davis, and Hade Davis .
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Reason and logic dictate the correct conclusion that
there was a valid delivery and conveyance of the involved
acreage to the defendant Bertagnole and the defendantappellant herein.
The determination made by the trial court as the fact
finder in this instance is flagrantly erroneous.

Careful

examination of the relevant facts, testimony, and evidence
permits no other conclusion.

Incapable of being supported

by the record in this matter ci.nd unabashedly pejorative of

the interests of the defendant-appellant Davis, the lower
court's decision must be reversed.
SECOND ARGUMENT
WAS THERE A VALID DELIVERY OF THE
QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM GOLD OIL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION TO LEO M.
BERTAGNOLE?
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ANSWERS "YES."
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO."
Defendant-appellant Davis contends that the decision of
the lower court must be reversed as it is in absolute,
direct contravention of the judicial precedent found in this
state and numerous other jurisdictions.
Sagacious adherence to the legal axiom that a decision
of a lower court will not be disturbed except for reasons
judicially sanctioned is abundant in the case law of this
. 23.
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jurisdiction.

Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28

2d 368, 603 P.2d 137 (1972).
v. Steele Ranch,

Ut~

Utah State Road Commission

533 P.2d 888 (1975).

Branch v. Western

Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361, 502 P.2d 570 (1972).
However, as is noted in Elton,

~upra,

and !-lardy v.

Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972), a manifest
misapplication of the law by rhe trial court requires a
reversal of the lower court's decision.
On appeal, the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to sustain

the lower court, and the findings will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly
against the weight of the evidence or it
manifestly appears that the court misapplied the law to the established
facts. Hardy, supra, at pages 29 and 30
(citations in text omitted).
It should also be noted that, in this instance, the
decision of the lower court is not to be cloaked with any
presumption of accuracy as the subject matter of this appeal
dictates that the defendant-appellant be given a trial de
novo by this court.
It is true, as plaintiff asserts,
that this action to avoid deeds is one
in equity upon which thi$ court has both
the prerogative and the duty to review
and weigh the evidence and to determine
the facts. Del Porto, supra, page 812.
Adhering to this tenor of a judicially sanctioned trial
de

~.

the Utah Supreme Court, in Lake v. Hermes

.24.
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Associa~,

552 P.2d 126 (1976), delineated its task of interpreting the
documentary evidence admitted at trial.
The defendant places reliance on
the standard presumption of credibility
and verity to be accorded the findings
and judgment of the trial court. However,
in a case of this nature, where the resolution of the controversy depends on the
meaning to be given documents, the trial
court is in no more favored position and
is no better able to determine the meaning
of such documents than is this court.
Therefore, as to such an issue, those
presumptions do not apply. ~ake, supra,
at 128.
The contention of the defendant-appellant Davis that
the lower court erroneously applied the controlling law to
this cause of action is premised upon a dual-pronged argument.

First, defendant-appellant Davis maintains that the

earnest money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5)
embodies all the terms relevant to the conveyance of property by the plaintiff-respondent to defendant Leo Bertagnole.
The earnest money receipt (Defendants' Exhibit Number
5) was drafted on March 18, 1977 (T42, T45, T76, T77, T78,
Tl09, TllO, Tll9), one day antecedent to the letter of
l!arch 17, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) (Tl6, Tl7,
T25, T26, TSO, T90, Tl33).
Lines 41 and 42 of the earnest money agreement
state:
It is understood and agreed that
the terms written in this receipt constitute the entire preliminary contract
between the purchaser and seller and
. 25.
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that no verbal statement made by anyone
relative to this transaction shall be
construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporated in writin~
herein . .
0

Thus, the terms of the letter dated March 17, 1977
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10), were extinguished and
merged into the terms contained within the earnest money
agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5).
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977);
862 (Utah 1973);

Stubbs v.

Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah

1978).
As noted by the court in Stubbs, supra, collateral acts
which are to be performed by a party will not be excused by
application of the principle of merger.
However, there are no collateral acts mandated by this
letter.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10).

Thus, the terms, spirit, and intent of this letter
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) were merged into the earnest
money agreement (Defendants' Exhibit Number 5) and forever
put to rest.

Plaintiff-respondent's attempts to revive the

letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 10) amount to little more
than futile attempts to permeate a legal barrier premised
upon sound legal rationale and fortified by unswerving
judicial adherence.
Defendant Bertagnole was vested with title to the
property in Salem Hills when the quit-claim deed (Defen-
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dants' Exhibit Humber 11), absolute on its face, was -delivered
to him.
Furthermore, like any other property owner, he was able
to divest himself of this property at his will for terms
acceptable to him.

This is precisely what he did a short

time after the quit-claim deed to him from plaintiffrespondent (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was recorded in
Utah County.
Ann Davis.

His grantees are Steven C. Davis and Kristi

A duly-recorded quit-claim deed (Plaintiff's

Exhibit Number 3) conveys ten acres of property in Salem
Hills to them.

Steven Davis and Kristi Davis subsequently

conveyed their interest in this property to Wade Davis and
Kristi Davis.

(Defendants' Exhibit Number 2).

was also recorded.

This deed

Each of these individuals should be

recognized as the owners of their respective parcels of
property.

Reversal of the lower court's decision is fund-

amental to a sound resolution of this action not only
because of the trial court's erroneous categorization of the
documentary evidence but also because it is in irreconcilable
juxtaposition with the law applicable to this action.
Defendant-appellant Davis' second argument is that
there was an unconditional delivery of the quit-claim deed
to defendant Bertagnole.

(Defendants' Exhibit Number 1).

26 Corpus Juris Secundum, Deeds, Section 48, relates
the general rule that a validly delivered deed that is void

.27.
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of any express conditions will pass absolute title to the
grantee.
As a general rule, a delivery of a
deed must be absolute and unconditional
unless it is in escrow. Further, as
appears in Escrows, Section 7, as a
general rule, a delivery in escrow may
be made only to a third person not a
party to the transaction, and there can
be no such delivery to the grantee on a
condition not expressed in the instrument. Accordingly, while there is some
authority to the contrary, it is generally
held that delivery to the grantee of a
deed absolute on its face will pass
complete title to him regardless of any
condition or contingency on which its
operative effect is made to depend,
provided, of course, there is otherwise
a sufficient delivery under the rules
stated supra, Sections 41-47, without
reservation of control or dominion over
the deed by the grantor.
To thus vest
complete title in the grantee, however,
it is essential that it shall be the
intention of the grantor that the instrument shall become operative, without
further act on his part, on performance
of the condition, and the rule applies
only to those deeds which are on their
face complete contracts, requiring
nothing but delivery to make them perfect, and does not apply to those which
on their face import that something
besides delivery is necessary to be done
in order to make them complete.
26
Corpus Juris Secundum, sup(a.
See also
6 Powell on Real Property 1977), Section
897.
The following discussion from 23 American Jurisprudence
2d, Deeds, Section 92, is in accord with the above-stated
axioms.
From the general rule that is
essential to an escrow that the instrument be delivered to a stranger to the
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instrument, the view evolved that a
deed cannot be delivered in escrow to
the grantee therein. Under this view,
the effect of a direct delivery of a
deed to the grantee cannot be obviated
by the intention of the parties that it
shall operate as an escrow; in other
words, a deed delivered to the grantee
with the understanding that it is not to
be operative until some condition
precedent shall have been performed by
the grantee, or some contingency shall
have happened, is fully operative, at
least as between the grantor and an
innocent purchaser, notwithstanding the
condition is never performed or the
contemplated event never happens. In
such cases, the grantor, by the act of
handing the deed to the grantee, in fact
passes title to the grantee; to permit
him to set up the condition by parol
would contradict his deed, and hence,
parol evidence as to such delivery or
condition is inadmissible.
From the facts presented at trial, it must be concluded
that the delivery to defendant Bertagnole was sufficient to
transfer title to him.

The quit-claim deed conveying the

property to defendant Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit Number
1), written in the present tense, is unconditional in its
terms.

Furthermore, if the letter of March 17, 1977 (Plain-

tiff's Exhibit Number 10), is interpreted to signify a
desire by Verdi Hhite, Sr., to pla~e the quit-claim deed in
escrow, it must be noted that nothing in the trial record
documents an attempt by the grantor to place the quit-claim
deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) with Security Title
Company, the named escrow agent .

. 29.
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However, the only method to determine if the delivery
to defendant Bertagnole was conditional is precluded by
judicial fact, as such investigation is violative of the
parol evidence rule.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, supra.

Thus, the proper conclusion is that title to this
property was vested i_n defendant Bertagnole when the quitclaim deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) was delivered to
him.

Verdi R. \mite's departure to record the deed from

Steven Davis and Kristi Davis to the plaintiff-respondent
(Plaintiff's Exhibit J:fomber 14) without further instructions
to his agent, James Hedlin, is conclusively demonstrative of
his intent to bind the plaintiff-respondent to the just
concluded negotiations with defendant Bertagnole.
T29, T45, T78, T79, Tll9).

(T28,

This, in the words of one very

distinguished scholar, is sufficient to construe the intent
of the grantor to make a valid delivery on the deed.
8 Thompson on Real Property (1963), Section 4227.
Furthermore, the grantees of defendant Bertagnole,
Steven Davis and Kristi Davis, were in actuality vested with
title to the property conveyed to them by defendant Bertagnole
(Defendants' Exhibit number 3).

These conveyances evidenced

by the following exhibits (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1,
Defendants' Exhibit Number 2, and Plaintiff's Exhibit Number
3) should be given unclouded legal cognizance .

. 30.
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Lastly, the plaintiff-respondent was not able to meet
or properly rebut the presumption operative in this state
that the recording of a deed is evidence of its delivery.
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355 (1934);
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413
P.2d 807 (1966).
Furthermore, this presumption is to be rebutted by
"clear and convincing evidence."

Chamberlain, supra, and

Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra.
Both Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence
2d maintain that the recording of a deed is factual proof of
the absolute delivery of the deed.

26 Corpus Juris Secundum,

Deeds, Section 44; 23 American Jurisprudence 2d, Deeds,
Section 94.
As detailed in the trial proceedings, the plaintiffrespondent relinquished the quit-claim deed to defendant
Bertagnole, as grantee (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1), to
their agents James Medlin and Steven C. Davis.

Implicit in

the agreement between Verdi R. White, Sr. , and Steven C.
Davis (Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 4) is the understanding
'

.

that Steven C. Davis will undertake to consummate a sale of
the 12 acres in Salem Hills as the agent for the plaintiffrespondent.

Explicit in this same agreement (Plaintiff's

Exhibit Humber 4) and from the subsequent tenor of the

. 31.
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negotiations with the defendant Bertagnole is the status of
James Medlin as an agent of the plaintiff-respondent .
.. . Some courts hold that no intent
to make delivery appears where the recorder
was expressly instructed that the deed
was to be delivered to the grantor, or the
grantor's agent, but other courts recognize
the presur11ption of delivery arising from
the fact that the grantor caused the deed
to be recorded even where the deed, after
recording, was returned to the grantor ...
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, Section 94.
The latter position is the one which has been adopted
in this jurisdiction and several others.

Chamberlain,

supra; Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra; State, By Pai
v. Thom, 563 P.2d 983 (1977); Takacs v. Takacs, 317 Mich.
72, 26 N.W.2d 712 (1947); Dyer v. Skaden, 128 Mich. 348, 87
N.W. 277 (1901); In Re Hume's Etate, 123 Mont. 223, 272 P.2d
999 (1954).
The rule seems to be well settled
that a deed duly executed and acknowledged and shown to be in the possession
of the grantee is self-proving both as
to execution and delivery, and that the
recording of a deed is likewise evidence
of delivery. Chamberlain, supra, at page
361.
To successfully defeat this presumption and annul the
conveyances in question, the plaintiff had to meet its
burden of proof with clear and convincing evidence.
And not only is the burden of
proving nondelivery upon the plaintiffs,
but the inference of delivery arising
from the possession of the deed by the
grantee and from the recording thereof
is entitled to great and controlling
weight and can only be overcome by clear
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and convincing evidence.
supra, at page 36.

Chamberlain,

Or, as the court more recently stated:
Of prime importance is the rule
that one who asserts the invalidity of
a deed must so prove by clear and convincing evidence. The recording of a
deed raises a presumption of delivery,
which presumption is entitled to great
and controlling weight and which can
only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. Controlled Receivables, Inc.,
supra, at page 809.
The nature of evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption and validity of a recorded deed is detailed in
23 Arn. Jur. 2d, Deeds, Section 126:
When a presumption of a deed arises,
nothing except the most satisfactory
evidence of non-delivery can prevail
against it; a mere preponderance of the
evidence is not sufficient.
At trial, Verdi R. White, Sr., made several admissions
that he had delivered the deed to the agents, Steven Davis
and James Medlin, who were authorized to negotiate the sale
of the 12-1/2 acres to defendant Bertagnole.
Tl9, T20, T22, T27, T28).

(Tl7, Tl8,

There was not a single allegation

or an iota of proof at trial that the quit-claim deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) had not been given to an agent for
delivery to the grantee upon the successful completion of
the negotiations.
Independant recollection from the defendant-appellant
Davis (TSO, T31, T84, T85, T36, T87, Tl35, Tl36) and the
. 33.
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defendant Leo Bertagnole (Tl08, Tl22, Tl23) related that
Verdi R. White, Sr., delivered the deed to an agent of the
plaintiff-respondent.
The admissions aforementioned by Verdi R. White, Sr.,
are significant.

These admissions conclusively and thorough!::

defeat any claim by the plaintiff-respondent that there was
no delivery of the quit-claim deed to defendant Leo Bertagnolt
(Defendants' Exhibit Number 1).
Furthermore, Mr. White's testimony alone is sufficient
to permanently silence the allegations of the plaintiffrespondent that the delivery was conditional.

Counsel for

the plaintiff-respondent asked Hr. White if he had ever
authorized the delivery of the quit-claim deed (Defendants'
Exhibit Number 1) to Mr. Bertagnole.

He responded, "Only on

the grounds that they complete the sale."

(T20).

Testimony, which has already been detailed elsewhere in
this brief, places Hr. White in Mr. Bertagnole's office
until some time after the purchase price for the property
had been established.

In other words, relinquishment of the

deed by the president of the plaintiff-respondent did not
occur until after he was satisfied that a valid purchase of
the property had been made.
Any assertion that there was a conditional delivery to
defendant Leo Bertagnole is inherently affected with frailty
that reasonably casts doubt upon its accuracy and truthfulness
. 34.
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In addition, any allegation that there was no de.livery
of the deed (Defendants' Exhibit Number 1) is patently
absurd.

There was a total absence of proof to sustain this

allegation.
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the act of
recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery in this
state.

Chamberlain, supra; Controlled Receivables, Inc.,

supra.
The conveyance to Leo Bertagnole (Defendants' Exhibit
!lumber 1) was recorded in Utah County on May 3, 1977.

On

this date, the conveyance of ten acres to Steven Davis and
Kristi Ann Davis (Defendants' Exhibit Number 3) was also
recorded.

The conveyance to Hade Davis and Kristi Davis

from Steve Davis and Kristi Davis (Defendants' Exhibit
!lumber 2) was recorded on June 15, 1978.

These conveyances

are prima facie proof of title in the respective grantees
and should be so recognized.
There is no evidence, much less evidence of a clear and
convincing nature, that dictates this annulment.

However,

there is araple authority that the decision of the trial
court is an undeniable, unfortunate misapplication of the
controlling law.

Reason, logic, and equity dictate that the

lower court's decision be reversed .
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CONCLUSIOU
The lower court erred in its finding that the delivery
of a quit-claim deed for approximately 12-1/2 acres in Utah
County to defendant Leo M. Bertagnole was conditional.
Defendant-appellant Davis relies heavily upon this court's
rulings in Chamberlain v. Larsen, supra, and Controlled
Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, supra.

The court's holdings

in both of these cases are patently applicable in the instant case.

In each of the above-cited cases, the court

maintained that the recording of a deed created a presumption of delivery which could only be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.
Elicited at trial was the fact that the plaintiff's
president delivered the quit-claim deed naming defendant
Bertagnole as the grantee to his agent after he and other
representatives of the plaintiff were present during negotiations for the purchase of this property.
Competent documentary evidence to support the allegations that there was a lack of delivery to defendant
Bertagnole, or that any delivery to the defendant Bertagnole
was conditional, was lacking.

Competent testimony to

support these allegations was also absent at trial.
At trial, the plaintiff failed to present evidence of
a sufficiently clear and convincing nature to rebut the
presumption operative in this jurisdiction.

A legally
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correct decision would, therefore, have rejected the allegations found in the plaintiff's complaint and denied them
their requested relief.
Denial of defendant-appellant Davis' appeal to vest
title in the grantees of defendant Bertagnole and Steven C.
Dav::.s would be a misapplication of the law applicable to
this action and defeat justice.
Wherefore, the defendant-appellant respectfully prays
to have the lower court's order reversed as a matter of law;
in the alternative, the defendant-appellant seeks to have
this court vacate the lower court's decision and remand
back for a factual hearing on the merits of this matter.
DATED this

c:;;.

~day

of September, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
Carolyn L. Driscoll and
Nicolaas DeJonge
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Davis

By

c:,~/

,,Z

£.~

Car~: Driscoll

. 37.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief
of Defendant-Appellant Davis was served on counsel for the
respondent, Woodrow D. White, 2121 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this <€ c;-;;_, day of September, 1979.

~~-~
~ ~=Ycar~L. Driscol
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